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Abstract  
We study a tax evasion response to car taxes in Finland, where used car importers 
overstate the mileage to reduce tax liability. First, we develop a tax evasion 
measure by comparing reported mileage upon import with subsequent information 
from vehicle inspections, and find that a decline in mileage — “missing miles” — 
occurs frequently. Second, we analyze a tax rate increase, and observe a reduction 
in the number of imported used cars, but only among non-evaders. Finally, we 
analyze an RCT informing some potential importers about a program of 
inspections that uncover true odometer readings, and the results suggest that third-
party reporting reduces evasion. 
Key words: car tax, tax evasion, enforcement measures 
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1 Introduction
Car taxes are part of many countries’ environmental policies (Sallee 2011), but these poli-
cies may create unintended behavioral responses. For example, car manufacturers have
been found to (legally) alter the tax-relevant characteristics of cars without materially
changing the actual functioning of the cars (Klier and Linn 2010, 2012, Sallee and Slem-
rod 2012 and Reynaert and Sallee 2016) and some companies, notably Volkswagen, have
been caught cheating on emission tests. In this paper we analyze Finnish data to explore
a previously unexamined response to car taxes. Importers of used cars may evade some of
the car tax by overstating the vehicle’s mileage1, reducing the tax base and the tax due.
We can provide a high-quality estimate of the magnitude of tax evasion by comparing
the stated mileage upon import to the mileage collected in mandatory car inspections
carried out at the same time or soon after. Observing that reported mileage upon import
is higher than the mileage from the inspections is a nearly foolproof trace of car import
tax evasion—“missing miles.” We provide evidence that plain-vanilla odometer fraud is
not “driving” our main results.
Some previous papers have analyzed the impact of tax rates on probability of evasion
(Fisman and Wei 2004 and Marion and Muehlegger 2008). We are able to estimate
not only how tax rates affect the probability of tax evasion and the decision to import
a car, but also estimate how exogenous variation in tax rates affects evaders and non-
evaders separately. To accomplish this, we focus on a Finnish car import tax reform in
April 2012 that significantly increased tax rates on cars with high CO2 emissions, while
leaving tax rates on cars with median or low CO2 emissions either unchanged or only
slightly increased. We separate used car importers into evaders and non-evaders using
our missing-miles trace measure of evasion described above.
Finally, we estimate the evasion and real responses to changes in the strictness of tax
enforcement, in particular the usage of third-party information in tax enforcement. We
begin by examining the effects of a change in the enforcement regime in 2013, where third-
party information became more extensively used in enforcement. Because this evidence is
not compellingly causal due to the lack of a control group that did not face the change in
an enforcement regime, we follow up by analyzing a randomized controlled trial designed
in collaboration with the Finnish Customs that varied the salience of tax enforcement
for car importers in the latter half of 2014. Although previous literature has considered
both sending letters increasing the subjective probability of being audited and having
third-party information in general (e.g. Kleven et al. 2011 and Pomeranz 2015), we
contribute to this literature by considering exogenous variation related to using third-
1In this paper we use the word “mileage” to refer to the total number of miles a vehicle has been
driven, or a report on that figure, rather than its alternative meaning as the average distance a vehicle
can travel on a specified quantity of fuel; we will use the term “fuel efficiency” to refer to the latter
concept.
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party information in tax enforcement.
Our results show systematic evidence of missing-miles evasion. We find that approxi-
mately 10% of used cars imported to Finland between 2008 and 2015 exhibit a compelling
trace of at least some tax evasion; most of this evasion is observed at the registration
inspection conducted either before, about at the same time or soon after the car import
tax declaration. We show that tax evasion occurs to some extent from all kinds of used
imported cars, but most prominently among slightly older cars that have lower average
fuel economy.
We present one of our main results by utilizing the tax reform in April 2012 which
shows that on average used car imports decline after the reform. We divide imported
used cars into a high CO2 group, for which tax rates increased by 6.5% on average, and
low CO2 group, for which tax rates increased by only 1.5% on average. We also divide
all imported used cars into different groups further using our missing-miles measure for
tax evasion, resulting in four groups that we follow over the reform. We find that the
decline in the number of imported used cars occurred primarily in the high CO2 group for
which taxes have not been evaded. Otherwise, imports among the four groups follow each
other reasonably well before the reform and continue on these trends after the reform.
We do detect some decline in the high CO2 group that evaded taxes, but this decline
is not statistically significant. These data patterns suggest that car import decisions do
depend on tax rates, but very weakly among tax evaders, consistent with statutory tax
rates mattering less among those who do not comply with these rates. Thus, the reform
increased the overall extent of evasion because it reduced the base of cars from which
taxes have not been evaded. We also estimate the elasticity of the number of imported
used cars separately for evaders and non-evaders and find an elasticity of -1.6 for non-
evaders, and a statistically not significant elasticity for evaders. The elasticity estimate
takes the continuous tax variation into account and thus captures the full response to tax
incentives better than the differences-in-differences estimate.
Having established that missing-miles tax evasion responds only weakly to variation
in the tax rate, a natural follow-up inquiry concerns what it does respond to. Evidence
derived from a change in the enforcement regime in 2013 strongly suggests that stricter
enforcement does reduce tax evasion: as soon as the tax authority began extensive usage
of third-party information, the number of cars on which taxes were evaded began to
decline sharply, and the drop continued for many years. The decline in tax evasion
occurred similarly among cars to which high or low tax rates are applied. In this way
the combination of the differential timing of tax reform and the change in enforcement
regimes allows us to identify how tax rates and enforcement separately influence car
import and tax evasion decisions.
Finally, we analyze an RCT to provide causal evidence of the impact of tax enforce-
ment on tax evasion. In 2014, in cooperation with the Finnish customs authority, we
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implemented an RCT that informed some likely car importers of the use of the third-
party information that began to be collected in 2013. One treatment in the experiment
increased the salience of the public disclosure of reported mileage, which makes “missing
miles” visible to potential buyers of the car. The results from this experiment, which are
intention-to-treat effects, suggest that these enforcement treatments reduced the preva-
lence of missing-miles evasion, supporting the view that this type of tax evasion responds
more clearly to tax enforcement than to variation in tax rates. Notably, though, we do
not find any effect of the enforcement-related treatments on the number of imported used
cars, which is consistent with the earlier analysis.
One potential challenge with our method of measuring tax evasion with missing miles
is that odometer fraud could also explain declining apparent mileage over time: sellers
of used cars might try to get a higher price for the car by fraudulently reducing the
mileage shown on the car odometer. However, we show that most of the tax evasion we
detect is observed at the time of the initial registration inspection, which usually occurs
within a couple of weeks of the car import tax declaration. We argue that this cannot
be odometer fraud because, if one is willing to alter the odometer, the incentives are
to align the odometer reading, i.e. to increase the odometer mileage at the time of the
registration inspection to equal the mileage in the import car tax declaration so as to
avoid getting detected evading taxes. Plain-vanilla odometer fraud would entail much
lower risk of detection if it were done after the registration inspection. We show that our
main results regarding the effect of 2012 tax reform and 2013 tax enforcement reform
hold even when confining the analysis to the tax evasion observed very soon after the
registration inspections.
This paper explores a formerly unstudied variety of tax evasion, using methods that
have been utilized in the recent explosion of academic interest in this area.2 One broad
finding in accordance with our results is that individuals and firms do respond to informa-
tion about expanded enforcement, at least in the short run, by reducing tax evasion (see,
e.g., Slemrod, Blumenthal, and Christian 2001, Pomeranz 2015 and Meiselman 2018),
especially in settings where third-party information had not been extensively utilized in
tax enforcement (see, e.g., Kleven et al. 2011 and Naritomi 2019). The reduction in total
tax evasion might be offset through increases in evasion from other variables affecting
the tax base, as in Carrillo et al. (2017). In our case there is no visible offsetting effect
through elsewhere in tax base, and thus the total tax revenue increases when tax evasion
through inflated mileage is reduced, possibly because there are no obvious alternative
methods to evade taxes. Since these kinds of institutional features might have an effect
on total tax evasion, it is interesting to study tax evasion in different contexts.
Our finding that non-evaders respond to statutory tax rate changes more than evaders
2For a more comprehensive surveys of the burgeoning recent literature of the empirical analysis of
tax evasion, see Slemrod (2017).
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do has not been heretofore demonstrated. According to this mechanism, the extent of
tax evasion might respond to tax rates even when tax evaders themselves do not change
their behavior. This phenomenon is more likely to occur in situations where extensive
margin responses are common (such as when economic agents are importing goods). For
example, the result by Fisman andWei (2004), showing that a higher tax rate is associated
with more tariff evasion, could be partly explained through this mechanism. Overall, our
results suggest that being able to distinguish real behavior and tax evasion is important
to better understand what underlies the aggregate responses to policies.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the Finnish car import tax system
and related enforcement details, Section 3 presents the data and our indicator of tax
evasion. Section 4 offers evidence on what factors affect tax evasion, shows evidence of
the “missing miles,” and discusses the results of the RCT. Section 5 offers concluding
remarks.
2 Car Import Practices and Car Taxes in Finland
2.1 Car Import Practices
Figure 1 shows the number of new and used cars imported into Finland between 2008 and
2014. On average, more than 100,000 new cars are imported annually. Used car imports
comprise over 15% of the yearly addition to the Finnish car fleet. Most of the used car
importers are private individuals as opposed to firms. As we discuss below, there is a
declining trend in the number of used cars imported after 2010, with no similar trend
appearing for new cars. While there are no sharp changes in the time trends, we observe
a small decrease in car imports after the 2012 reform that increased the average car tax
rate.
When importing a used car to Finland, one needs to report the transaction by filing
a form with Customs and then, within five days, filing a car tax declaration, also to
Customs. This declaration specifies the vehicle identification number, make, model, age,
CO2 emission value (g/km), weight, special equipment, and other information about the
condition of the car. We have all this information in our data and, crucially to our study,
the information relating to the condition of the car includes the mileage reported at the
time of import.
Usually at the same time as the car tax declaration, one starts the process of registering
the car, the first step of which is to take the car to a registration inspection that records
the vehicle identification number, make and model, and also checks that the car fulfills
the requirements for cars driven in Finland (such as having a rear fog light). Registration
must be done within four months of filing the car tax declaration, but most people
start the registration process simultaneously, or even before, filing the car import tax
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Figure 1: Number of new and used cars imported to Finland over time
declaration. Figure 21 in Appendix F presents the distribution of the number of days
between filing the tax declaration and the registration inspection. The distribution is
visibly centered at zero and most of the mass is within 30 days of filing the taxes, and it
seems to be rather common also to file the tax form before registration, as illustrated by
the mass on the left-hand side of zero.
2.2 Car Taxes
Almost all cars driven in Finland are imported.3 Finland levies a tax on all vehicles4
imported into or newly registered in Finland, regardless of whether the vehicle is new or
used. We will refer to this as the car tax.5 This tax must be remitted before a vehicle’s
introduction to, or first registration, in Finland, and is collected by Finnish Customs.
The person entered in the register as the owner of the vehicle is liable for remitting the
car tax, unless the vehicle is imported by a business that Customs has authorized as a
3For example, in 2011, the mid-year of Figure 1, only 2,540 new cars were manufactured in Finland
as the total number of new imported cars to Finland was 126,123.
4This includes passenger cars, vans, buses, motorcycles, and other vehicles.
5In addition to the car tax, an annual vehicle tax is collected on all registered cars in Finland. This
tax contains two parts. The first part is the so-called “basic” tax that depends on the CO2 emission
value or, for older cars, the mass of the vehicle. An additional part applies only to cars that use other
than petrol as a motive power, e.g. diesel, so that the annual vehicle tax is higher for these cars. Note
that vehicle tax liability does not depend on the value or other characteristics of cars, and amounts for
a typical car to between 100 and 400 euros.
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registered agent, in which case the agent must remit the tax.6
Car tax is based on the value of the car, V . A small deduction is made from this
value to determine the taxable value. The rate of tax applied depends on the CO2 values
according to a schedule stated in the law. The CO2 values are assigned according to
international standards for new cars, and the same value applies to all cars of a particular
make, model and engine size regardless of the actual CO2 emissions of an individual car.7
Car taxes are derived simply by multiplying the taxable value of a car by the car tax rate
so that tax due is T = V ∗ τ(CO2).
Customs estimates the value for used cars based on the price of similar cars sold
in Finnish retail markets, depending on the technical characteristics of a car, such as
the make, model, and age of the car as well as its overall condition. One important
input to this estimation procedure is the car’s mileage, m; ceteris paribus, higher mileage
reduces the estimated taxable value. If reported mileage mr is higher than the true
mileage m∗, also the estimated value V (mr) < V (m∗) and thus car taxes are lower:
T r = V (mr) ∗ τ(CO2) < T ∗ = V (m∗) ∗ τ(CO2). This constitutes the incentive to evade
taxes by means of overstating mileage when filing the car tax return.
In this paper we first examine the impact of the reform of April 1, 20128, which raised
the gradient of the tax schedule with respect to CO2 emissions. Figure 2 depicts the
tax schedules before and after the 2012 reform by CO2 values (right y-axis), and shows
that the reform made the tax schedule more steeply dependent on CO2 values and that
the tax rate increased for virtually all used cars, declining only in the very low end of
the CO2 distribution when comparing the tax schedule that took effect in April 2012
to the tax schedule before that, which had been applied after 2009. Figure 2 adds the
distribution of imported used cars by CO2 values, with densities on the left y-axis. The
vertical dashed line corresponds to a division of imported cars into two groups that we
will use in the analysis of the impact of the 2012 reform.
2.3 Car Tax Enforcement
Missing-miles evasion consists of reporting a falsely high mileage when filing the car
tax return, perhaps while also overstating the reading on the odometer. Misstating the
odometer reading would be detected if Customs were to inspect the odometer, but the
Customs authorities do not regularly check the odometers. If one also alters the odometer,
the evasion would not be caught even in the case of an inspection. The two standard
6If the tax cannot be collected from the registered agent, the person entered in the register as the
vehicle’s owner is liable for the tax, unless he or she can demonstrate having remitted to the registered
agent or their representative an amount expected to be the tax liability.
7In case the official CO2 value is not available, the mass of the car is used instead with an associated
tax schedule.
8Finlex 57/2011. The purpose of the reform was to increase tax revenue and to improve the environ-
mental impact of the import car tax policy.
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Figure 2: The CO2 distribution of imported used cars around the 2012 reform and the
tax schedule change
methods to alter an odometer reading are to buy a dedicated device for the purpose, which
costs a few hundred euros, or to buy odometer changing as a service from a company.
The fines for falsely reporting mileage are defined loosely in the law, and are thus
largely at the discretion of Customs. They depend on the severity of the misreporting,
and at a minimum the owed taxes must be paid plus a small fine. In the event of multiple
offenses, a criminal case may be opened against the car importer, with the possibility of
imprisonment.
We describe next how the car tax enforcement changed in the 2013 reform and the
utilization of third-party information.
2.4 Measuring Missing Miles and the 2013 Enforcement Reform
We can assess car tax evasion through over-reported mileage upon import because we
have access to a novel source of comparison information about cars’ true mileage that
originates from annual car inspections that are mandatory for all cars registered for use
on public roads in Finland. The data from the Finnish Transport Safety Agency (FTSA)
contain mileage information from annual inspections (in later years, cars under five years
old need to be inspected biannually). In addition, we have access to another data source
that contains mileage information from a sample of about 40% of car inspections from
2008–2012.9 Using this chain of links, we can follow the same car from the day it was
9The data in the 40% sample come from one car inspection company that recorded odometer readings
during this period. Thus, this is not a random sample and is not necessarily representative of the universe
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imported to Finland, through its annual inspections, until it is removed from the FTSA
registers when it is scrapped or exported. Comparing the reported mileage upon import
inspection to the mileage at the inspection provides insight regarding missing miles. The
Customs data also allows us to see how frequently the same individuals or firms import
cars to Finland.
In 2013 the Finnish authorities began exchanging vehicle-related information across
different agencies for the purposes of more efficient tax enforcement. The FTSA man-
dated that the inspection stations performing the inspections to systematically record the
odometer reading from all cars. This information is gathered into registers and is also
available to Customs.10 Customs then have reliable comparison information about the
mileage with only a few months delay, which they can utilize in their tax enforcement.
The Customs began to run systematic checks on cars that had a suspiciously high discrep-
ancy between reported mileage and this new comparison information. Notably, though,
the Customs did not publicly advertise the existence of this information. Moreover, it
used only the mileage from the first registration inspection that takes place at the same
time, soon after, or before the car tax declaration is filed. It is thus possible to keep the
inflated reading on the odometer during this first inspection, and later reduce it. Then
the lower mileage would still be visible to a researcher at a later inspection.
Figure 3 shows the number of used cars imported to Finland over all, the number
of these that are ever observed in the inspection data and the number of these that are
observed soon after in the registration inspection. We observe most cars in the inspection
data and, of those that we observe, almost all also from the registration inspection (and in
subsequent inspections as well). We define “soon after” to refer to inspection information
that we observe within four months of the car import tax filing. We define the time period
between tax filing and inspection information to be rather long so that we have as many
tax filing observations with the comparison information as possible, especially because the
inspection data before 2013 is only a 40% sample of all inspections.11 Notably, Figure
3 shows that the share of imported cars for which we have inspection data, and were
inspected soon after tax filing, did not change markedly over time. Thus, we think that
observing a car in the inspection data does not produce any spurious changes over time
of car inspections.
10The exchange of information between car inspection stations, FTSA and Finnish Customs was passed
into law in January 2013, but did not come into effect until the beginning of 2014 (Finlex 144/2012).
However, in practice, car inspection stations started to collect mileage information in January 2013, some
already by October 2012. We also have auxiliary data source about mileage in car inspections from one
major inspection company beginning in 2008. Therefore, we have some information about inspection
from 2008, and comprehensive comparison information about the mileage of cars from 2013 onwards.
11We perform robustness checks using a shorter definition of the time period between tax filing and
inspection information, especially when we study the effects of the RCT on missing miles. Note also
that it is possible to bring an imported car to inspection before tax filing, as is visible from Figure 21
in the Appendix. Most of the inspections in our data are observed very close to the tax filing dates;
approximately 65% of comparison information is observed within two weeks of the tax filing date.
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in the tax evasion measures that we analyze below.
3 The volume and nature of missing miles
We describe here tax evasion among imported used cars using the FTSA and additional
40% inspection data combined with Customs data. The institutional setting described
above where all cars are mandated to regular inspections allow us to analyze this com-
prehensively.
3.1 The Frequency of Tax Evasion
Figure 4 depicts the frequency of missing miles, measured as the difference between
the mileage reported upon import and observed in inspection for used cars, for which
overstating mileage upon import can reduce tax liability. The left panel refers to those
cars for which car tax filing and inspection mileage are observed within four months of
each other; we will refer to such inspections as happening “immediately” or “soon after” as
the car import tax filing. The right panel shows the mileage difference for the remaining
cases between 2008 and 2015, i.e., those for which the inspection was observed more
than four months after import and import tax filing. In the right panel, unsurprisingly
there are many observed positive changes in observed mileage as time passes. Strikingly,
though, there is also substantial mass at negative values that expands to more than -
10
200,000 kilometers. The mileage of such cars at inspection is thus below the mileage
reported upon import.
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Figure 4: Distribution of mileage reported at inspection minus mileage reported upon
import
In one sense, the mileage observed during an inspection carried out about at the same
time as the car is imported provides our best measure of mileage inflation due to tax
evasion, because this measure is not obscured by the fact that the actual mileage of cars
naturally increases over time as they are driven. To more clearly observe the shape of this
distribution, Figure 5 reproduces the left panel of Figure 4 without the approximately 70%
of observations close to zero – excluding differences that are less than 5,000 kilometers.
The figure depicts the distinguishable misreporting of mileage and shows a clear spike at
-100,000 kilometers, along with another smaller one at -200,000 kilometers. These spikes
are consistent with round-number mileage inflation: for a car with less than 100k on
the odometer, a tax evader decides to put a number one (or two!) in front of the true
mileage when filling in the car tax declaration form. In some cases they could do the
same for the odometer, but those cases would not be observed in this figure, because then
the odometer mileage that comes from the registration inspection would be altered to a
higher figure to match the reported mileage.
We next describe the frequency of missing-miles tax evasion over time. Figure 6 shows
the number of imported used cars over time for which we have the mileage comparison
information from inspection, and adds two time series for apparent tax evaders. The
first series shows the number of used cars for which we observe tax evasion with our
missing miles measure and the second shows the number of cars for which the evasion is
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detected using mileage from the registration inspection conducted soon after the car tax
declaration. The graph confirms that a trace of evasion is present in about 10% of all
imported cars for which we have the evasion measure. Importantly, the figure shows that
almost all of the evasion we detect is through the registration inspections as opposed to
post-registration inspections, and that this do not change much over time.
Thus far, we have provided evidence strongly suggesting that some used car importers
inflated the reported mileage for tax evasion purposes. To understand more precisely how
common this is, and how the inflated mileage relates to the tax system, in Table 1 we
present some statistics related to car taxes and mileage.12 The first two columns of the
table present information about car taxes and mileage for all used cars, and the next six
columns show data for those cars likely evading: those that exhibit declining mileage of
more than 5,000 kilometers between import and the lowest mileage value in inspections
immediately after car tax filing or later. These statistics are shown for CO2 quintiles of
cars and, at the bottom of the table, as a total for all used cars. For each cell, the average
is provided with the number of observations below.
Given that, after the tax reform in 2008, the rate of car tax increased with CO2
emissions, it is meaningful that the average tax increases with the CO2 quintile. The
“km” column shows the average number of kilometers (in thousands) reported to have
12Appendix A gives the information on how we relate the amount of missing miles to tax evasion in
euros.
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been driven before import to Finland. On average, cars in all CO2 quintiles are driven
more than 100,000 kilometers, with the highest number in the middle CO2 quintile.
In each CO2 quintile, the car tax remitted by the apparent evaders is substantially
lower than the overall average, and the reported mileage is substantially higher. Of
course, the lower amount of car taxes could reflect that these cars have a true lower
value, that they have evaded taxes to arrive at the lower amount, or some of both. To
better understand this issue, the “km_ev” column shows the amount of mileage corrected
for tax evasion, which is the average amount of mileage inflation in car import tax fil-
ings calculated by adding to the mileage the observed negative difference between the
comparison information and the car tax report. It is clear that, conditional on evad-
ing, the average amount of mileage inflated (km_ev) is a large fraction of the reported
mileage (km), and the corrected mileage is actually lower for the evading cars–they are
below-average-mileage cars masquerading as above-average-mileage cars.
The last three columns in Table 1 show the fraction of cars having at least 5,000 kilo-
meters of inflated mileage in their import tax filing, separately according to whether we
observe the inspection immediately or later. Note that the relative number of observa-
tions in Column 6 implies that we observe about 94% of evasion immediately. Column 8
shows the same statistics using the shorter time interval of one month. This examination
supports the view that a very high fraction of the comparison information is observed
within one month after tax filing (87%) and that the average statistics are very similar
13
to those using our preferred definition in Column 6.13 The results confirm that having
some discrepancy between the reported and comparison mileage is by no means a rare
phenomenon. The frequency of apparent tax evasion increases with the CO2 quintile
(and therefore the tax rate), with the highest frequency observed in the fifth quintile
of the final column: 13% of the highest CO2 quintile cars are imported as used when
observed immediately, and 19% when observed later. Note that when we observe the
inspection mileage later, the share evading is consistently higher than when we observe
the inspection immediately, and for this (small) group of observations we cannot rule out
that some of the decline in mileage occurs due to odometer fraud rather than import tax
evasion. We take this issue up in the next section.
In Appendix B we provide the details of a procedure that uses these exercises to
estimate the total amount of missing-miles tax evasion. We conclude that 15% of the tax
that should have been remitted was not.
3.2 Could Odometer Fraud Explain Missing Miles?
Central to our analysis is the argument that, because inspection always occurs at the
same time or soon after import, mileage reported upon inspection that is less than what
is stated for tax purposes upon import is a strong trace of tax evasion. The only possi-
ble alternative explanation, other than unsystematic data errors, is downward odometer
fraud after import to increase the car’s resale value. But it is highly unlikely that odome-
ter fraud could explain our measure of tax evasion for those cars for which the comparison
information from inspections is observed soon after the car tax declaration. This is be-
cause, when the registration inspection takes place, the immediate incentive is to increase
the odometer reading to match the car tax declaration to avoid getting caught from im-
port car tax evasion. The risk of getting detected by the authorities of odometer fraud
reduces significantly after the registration car inspection.14 Odometer fraud by reducing
the odometer reading becomes potentially attractive before re-selling a car, but we would
observe this as declined mileage no sooner than in the inspection subsequent to the reg-
istration inspection, at least one year later. But recall that we already showed in Figure
6 that most of tax evasion we detect comes from registration car inspection. Thus, the
bulk of our trace measure of tax evasion is almost certainly not due to odometer fraud.
Nevertheless, it is interesting to evaluate the extent of odometer fraud in our data,
13Although we acknowledge that four months time difference between tax filing and inspection in-
formation might not strike all readers as “immediately”, we have two main reasons to argue that this
definition is suitable in this context: 1) A car importer is allowed to drive three months before registra-
tion inspection with a temporary license that allows at least that amount of time to visit an inspections
station, and 2) we want to include all credible comparison observations in our analysis so that we can
offer as precise results as possible.
14Most registration inspection take place within 30 days of filing the tax declaration as shown in Figure
21 in Appendix F.
14
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
All Evaders
CO2- Car tax km Car tax km km_ev D<-5k D<-5k D<-5k
quintiles Immed. Later <1 mo.
1 3,609 103 1,979 158 75 .054 .084 .052
35,202 35,202 1,989 1,989 1,989 32,630 2,572 30,037
2 4,268 127 2,586 198 105 .061 .10 .059
41,224 41,224 2,591 2,591 2,591 39,164 2,060 36,423
3 4,553 141 2,746 215 115 .088 .17 .085
34,435 34,435 3,209 3,209 3,209 32,372 2,063 29,731
4 4,695 147 3,001 204 111 .099 .17 .095
38,983 38,983 3,993 3,993 3,993 36,961 2,022 33,996
5 6,089 137 3,940 188 97 .13 .19 .13
36,479 36,479 4,880 4,880 4,880 34,187 2,292 31,297
Total 4,642 131 3,040 195 102 .086 .14 .083
186,323 186,323 16,662 16,662 16,662 175,314 11,009 161,484
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of car taxes and mileage for all cars and evading cars, years
2008–2015.
Note: Evaders are defined here as having more than 5,000 kilometers of misreported mileage in tax filing.
CO2 quintiles are calculated by dividing data according to car-level CO2 emissions as new. Car tax shows
the amount of average car taxes paid by different quintiles, km shows the average thousands of kilometers
reported in tax filing, km_ev depicts the difference between tax filing and comparison information, D<-
5k refers to having less than -5,000 kilometers difference between reported and observed mileage, Immed.
refers to observations for which the tax evasion measure is observed soon after, Later refers to observing
tax evasion from later inspections than soon after and <1 mo. refers to observing tax evasion from
inspections within one month from the tax filing.
given that it is regarded as a problem worldwide (European Commission 2014 and U.S.
Department of Transportation 2002). We investigate whether, in the absence of tax
incentives, downward changes in mileage are a common phenomenon. Figure 7 shows the
share of cars having ever observed at least 5,000 kilometer decline in mileage from one
inspection to another, and thus does not include reported mileage upon import. The cars
are recorded according to the year we first observe them in our data. The figure shows
that suspected odometer fraud is quite a common phenomenon, at times more than 15%
for cars imported as used and almost 10% for cars imported as new. Conveniently for
us, the probability of odometer fraud does not seem to have drastic changes over time,
especially around the reforms we utilize in the analysis below. For both groups there is
a downward trend, but that is expected as the cars we first observe later have had less
time to have been observed with a negative change in the odometer mileage.
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Figure 7: Suspected odometer fraud over time for cars imported as new and used
4 What Affects Tax Evasion?
4.1 The Impact of Tax Rates on Missing-Miles Tax Evasion
In this section, we analyze how car tax rates affect the extent of missing-miles tax evasion.
We first focus on examining the impact of tax rates on the probability that an imported
used car has an inflated mileage report, and then investigate the effect of car tax rates
on the amount of imported cars with and without tax evasion. In order to provide causal
evidence, we examine the 2012 reform described in Section 2.2.
Figure 2 in Section 2 shows the pre- and post-reform tax schedules and the distribution
of imported used cars by CO2 values, with densities on the left y-axis. In order to provide
graphical evidence on the impact of the change in tax rates, we divide the imported used
cars into two groups; those with CO2 emissions under 165 g/km and those above that
threshold. The dividing line between the groups is marked as the vertical dashed line,
with each group having a fair number of cars imported but a clear difference in the tax
changes faced. Below we also present estimates of the impact of tax rates on evasion
using continuous variation in tax rate changes.
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the two groups measured one year before
and after the April 2012 reform. The table shows that, in the lower CO2 group, the
average tax rate increased from about 23% prior to the reform to 24.5% after, while for
the high CO2 group it rose from about 30% to 36%; thus the increase was approximately
four times larger than for the high CO2 set of cars. The last column shows that 6% of the
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low CO2 group cars exhibit traces of tax evasion (at least 5,000 kilometers more reported
in the car tax filing compared to car inspection information), while the comparable figure
is 10% for the high CO2 group.
CO2 group Stat Car tax %, pre Car tax %, post Ind. tax evasion
Low CO2 Mean 22.91 24.45 0.06
Sd 2.23 3.43 0.24
N 9262 11854 9262
High CO2 Mean 29.92 36.20 0.10
Sd 6.37 6.09 0.31
N 31935 26238 31935
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for imported used cars prior and post to the 2012 reform
Note: Table shows car tax rates before and after the reform and the share of cars having tax evasion in
low and high CO2 value groups. Low CO2 group is defined to have less than 165 g/km of CO2 and high
CO2 group refers to cars equal or above 165 g/km.
In Figure 8, we show the number of imported cars over time for cars with and without
evasion in groups that faced high versus low tax increases. Consistent with the descriptive
analysis in Section 3, the number of cars on which taxes were not evaded is substantially
larger than evading cars in both tax-change groups. At the time of the 2012 reform,
marked with the darker vertical dashed line, we see that the number of cars with no tax
evasion declined in the high CO2 emission group, for which tax rates increased, by about
6 percentage points on average. In sharp contrast, the number of imported used cars in
the low-tax-increase group rose after 2012.
We examine more closely the changes in number of imported cars in different groups
in Figure 9. The figure shows the changes in log numbers of cars imported in different
groups, with all groups centered at zero in the half year prior to the reform in 2012 in
order to make comparison across groups easier. The graph shows that car imports were
increasing and following nearly parallel trends in all groups prior to the reform. The
seasonal pattern is somewhat different between evaders and non-evaders, but not to a
great extent.
At the time of the reform a significant gap appears among non-evaders between the
high-tax-change and low-tax-change groups. The higher tax rate seems to have led to
lower car imports in the non-evading group. Even with this closer examination we do
not see any deviation in the low-tax-change group from previous trend. A smaller gap
also appears between the two tax-change groups among evaders, but not as large or
displaying a clearly different pattern from pre-trends as among non-evaders. Tax evaders
seem to follow their pre-reform trend also in the year after the reform, before the 2013
tax enforcement reform kicks in. In sum, by examining all four groups, it seems that the
reform reduced the number of imported cars in the high-tax-change group who did not
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Figure 8: Number of imported used cars by missing-miles evasion and CO2 class
evade taxes.
To quantify this finding, we next estimate a differences-in-differences specification
where we compare the groups before and after the reform presented in Figure 9. We
estimate the following equation:
Ngt = β0 + β21(treatg) + β3DDgt + µt + β4Xgt + εgt (1)
where Ngt is the log of the number of cars imported in group g and half-year t. The
variable DDgt is an indicator term that is derived by interacting the variable 1(aftert),
an indicator taking the value of 1 after the reform in April 2012 and 0 before it, and
the variable 1(treatg), an indicator taking the value of 1 if the group of cars belongs to
the high tax change group and 0 otherwise. The value of β3 is the coefficient of interest,
measuring the effect of the tax reform on high-tax-change cars relative to low-tax-change
cars. We include flexible time trends, indicated by µt in the equation. The variable Xgt
is a control vector that includes a car make classification, 40 CO2 cells and eight car age
cells as well as the group level average car weight. We estimate this equation separately
for cars for which we infer that car import taxes have been evaded, and for cars for
which we infer that taxes have not been evaded. The standard errors are clustered at
group level, and together with clustering this reduces the problems arising from serial
correlation.
Table 3 shows the results of estimating specification (1). The data are aggregated to
these cells by the number of imported cars within each half year. Columns (1) and (2) are
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Figure 9: Relative change in the number of imported cars around the 2012 reform, by
tax change and missing-miles evasion
for non-evaders, columns (3) and (4) for evaders and column (5) combines both groups
and shows an interaction term with the effect of the tax reform. The results indicate that
for non-evaders the reform led to a statistically significant reduction in the number of
imported cars. Columns (3) and (4) show that, although the sign of the effect is negative
among evaders, it is much smaller in absolute value and not statistically significantly
different from zero. When we combine non-evaders and evaders in the same analysis in
column (5), we see that the point estimate for the interaction term is positive, going in the
opposite direction than the main effect of the reform, but is not statistically significant.
The lack of statistical precision for evaders could arise due to their small numbers, or
else reflect a small but imprecise effect. We conclude from this analysis that there is a
relatively stronger and clearer effect of a higher tax rate reducing the importing of used
cars for non-evaders than for evaders.
Column (6) in the table shows a car-level regression, where the outcome is a dummy
variable for whether or not taxes had been evaded from the car. Otherwise, the estimation
presented in this column follows the differences-in-differences setting where the tax reform
creates two groups by the tax change status, but now the focus is on the impact of the tax
reform on the likelihood of finding missing-miles evasion from an individual car imported
as used. The result indicates that the likelihood of tax evasion slightly increased after
the reform. This is consistent with the other results in the table and suggests again that
the likelihood increased because less cars were imported without evasion after the reform
than before the reform and relative to the cars with evasion.
19
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Vars Non-evaders Non-evaders Evaders Evaders Interact Evasion
Data grouping Make, 40 CO2 cells and 8 Age cells Car
DD tax -0.104*** -0.115*** -0.021 -0.014 -0.110*** 0.013***
(0.034) (0.027) (0.030) (0.030) (0.027) (0.005)
DD tax * Evade 0.053
(0.064)
Treat tax 0.148*** 0.413*** 0.184*** 0.030 0.330*** -0.007
(0.019) (0.126) (0.024) (0.107) (0.120) (0.027)
Evade -0.617***
(0.065)
N of cells /cars 16,958 16,958 4,806 4,806 18,134 79,169
R2 0.005 0.381 0.026 0.212 0.395 0.100
Controls No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Table 3: The impact of tax increase on number of imported cars among evaders and
non-evaders
Note: Table shows differences-in-differences results on data aggregated to number of cars in each sell
imported during a half-year. Columns (1) and (2) are for non-evaders, columns (3) and (4) for evaders
and column (5) shows an interaction term between evaders and non-evaders. In columns (2), (4) and (5)
we include coarse make, CO2 and car age class dummies as well as weight of a car as controls. Column
(6) presents car-level analysis on probability of tax evasion on a dependent variable taking value 1 when
tax evasion is observed and 0 when tax evasion is not observed. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
The fact that adding fixed effects of car characteristics does not greatly change the
results, evident for example by comparing columns (1) and (2) in the table, reduces the
worry that the changes in the average numbers after the reform arise from compositional
changes. Including the fixed effects renders the analysis to within cells of quite tightly
specified make, age and CO2 groups of cars. Thus, the changes occur within groups that
are similar on observational characteristics before and after the reform, and especially
have similar predicted values because these characteristics are important predictors of
the value of a car. In principle, there could be different kinds of individuals buying the
cars but, given that the cars are similar, the compositional change of individuals is a less
likely explanation for the result.
Another potential confounder to the validity of our DiD setting is that a general
equilibrium effect coming through prices in the used car markets would bias the direct
effect of the tax reform. To show some evidence on prices, Figure 15 in Appendix D
plots the price indices for used and new cars in Finland to show that the 2012 tax reform
did not induce any large changes in these prices as the indices do not show deviations
from their own trend after the reform. Although this does not capture all the general
equilibrium effects, we think it shows robustness against such effects.
In order to more precisely analyze the relationship between the tax rates, the number
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of imported used cars, and tax evasion, we next estimate the elasticity of the number of
imported used cars with respect to the tax price for different sub-samples. We calculate
the tax price as one plus the car tax rates described in Table 2 above. Then, we calculate
the logarithm of the number of used cars in cells defined by different classifications of
cars. We base the elasticities on the following regression equation.
4 logNcarct = α + β14 log(1 +MTR)ct + ζ1X + ct, (2)
where the dependent variable is the difference in the log number of cars from the two
years before the reform and two years after the reform in each cell, and the independent
variable is the difference in the log tax price for the cars in that cell. Thus, we aggregate
the data to before and after observations in order to reduce the problems associated with
serial correlation of observations. The other covariates in control vector X are the CO2
dummies and dummies for car age. We calculate this for all used cars imported around
the 2012 reform for which we observe the comparison mileage, and divide this into those
for which we presume that import taxes have been evaded and those for which we observe
that taxes have not been evaded. Note also that differencing the outcome already invokes
car cell fixed effects, meaning that we examine the change in the tax rate of specific
car type on imports of those cars, and do not include effects arising from changes into
importing different types of cars.
Table 4 shows the estimates of the elasticity of the number of imported used cars
with respect to the tax price. Columns (1) through (3) show a simple regression without
control variables for which the cells over which the data is aggregated are based on 40
CO2 classes, eight car age classes and make of a car similarly as the regressions in Table
3. Columns (4) through (6) include as controls the make of a car and age class indicators
as well as the average weight of a car within the cell. Columns (1) and (4) include all
observed cars for which we have comparison mileage information around the 2012 reform,
columns (2) and (5) include only cars for which we observe a trace of tax evasion, and
columns (3) and (6) include only cars for which we do not observe any trace of tax evasion.
Strikingly, the estimated elasticity attracts a different sign for the tax-evasion and no-
tax-evasion cars. Among the no-evasion cars, a lower tax-inclusive price (i.e., a lower tax
rate) is associated with higher demand, as would normally be expected. The elasticity
with respect to the tax price is estimated to be about -1.6, and is statistically significant in
column (6). In contrast, and corroborating the intuition derived from Figure 8, demand
for those cars for which we observe tax evasion does not respond to the changes in
statutory tax rates in a statistically significant way, and the point estimates are even
positive. This result is consistent with the idea that the possibility of evasion mitigates
what would otherwise be the demand-reducing impact of a tax increase.
We also analyze the elasticity of tax evasion in monetary terms in Appendix D. After
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARS All Evasion No evasion All Evasion No evasion
Elasticity -1.467*** 0.354 -1.878*** -1.138** 0.395 -1.579***
(0.554) (0.557) (0.595) (0.568) (0.673) (0.607)
Constant -0.044* -0.015 -0.023 0.008 -0.056 0.194***
(0.026) (0.038) (0.027) (0.165) (0.242) (0.016)
N cells 2,464 585 2,263 2,464 585 15,917
N cars 18,647 1,634 16,275 18,647 1,634 16,275
R2 0.005 0.000 0.007 0.056 0.073 0.041
Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Table 4: Elasticity of number of imported used cars with respect to the price plus tax
Note: Table shows the regression results on the number of imported used cars with respect to (1+car tax
rate). We aggregate the data to 40 CO2 classes, eight car age classes and make of a car, and before and
after observations. Columns (1) and (4) include all observed cars for which we have comparison mileage
information around the 2012 reform, columns (2) and (5) include only cars for which we observe a trace
of tax evasion, and columns (3) and (6) include only cars for which we do not observe any trace of tax
evasion. Heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors presented in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
controlling for the extensive margin response of whether or not a car is imported with
evasion, and other characteristics of a car, the elasticity of tax evasion in the intensive
margin is statistically and economically zero, as shown in Appendix Table 10. Given the
above result, this is an expected result. Table 10 also shows in column (7) that tax rates
still affect the amount of taxes remitted with a small positive elasticity.
In sum, in this section we uncover evidence that higher car tax rates do not affect the
number of cars imported with tax evasion, or the euro amount of tax evasion. In fact, the
analysis shows that the amount of tax evasion is quite insensitive to variation in tax rates.
In contrast, we showed that used car imports among non-evaders responds to tax rates.
This was evident both in the differences-in-differences analysis utilizing dichotomous tax
variation and in the elasticity analysis utilizing continuous tax variation. Thus, when
examining the impacts of tax rates, it seems crucial to account for tax evasion as the
results can be drastically different depending on possibilities for tax evasion.
4.2 The Impact of Enforcement on Missing-Miles Evasion
In this section we analyze the impact of the introduction of a new enforcement scheme
under which mileage information was systematically collected from car inspections and
compared to the reported tax filings by the Customs. This change in the enforcement
regime took place beginning in 2013, a year in which there were no car tax base or rate
changes.
Figure 10 depicts the number of imported used cars, dividing the data into two CO2
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groups, but restricting the sample to those for which we observe our trace of missing-miles
tax evasion. Recall that the car tax rate increased in 2012 for the high CO2 group by
approximately 6 percentage points on average, while the tax increase was on average 1.5
percentage points for the low CO2 group. As shown before, we do not observe any break
in the trend for evaders around the tax rate changes of 2012. What is clear, though, is
a dramatic decline in estimated tax evasion in both tax-change groups starting in the
latter half of 2013 that levels out only in the latter half of 2015. The clear break in
the trend starts precisely at the same time that the Customs began to employ the new
enforcement regime using third-party information from car inspections. We surmise that
car importers learned about this new regime gradually over time and, as they become
aware of it, many concluded that the chance of getting caught with missing miles had
non-trivially increased and now made tax evasion an unattractive gamble.
Tax enforcement, 2013
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Figure 10: Trends among imported used cars with observed evasion, divided into high
and low CO2 groups
To summarize, we find evidence of an intriguing, previously unexplored behavioral
mechanism. The results in Section 4.1 suggest that while non-evaders respond to the tax
rate increases by decreasing the number of imported used cars, evaders do not respond
nearly as strongly to tax rate changes. This section shows that stricter enforcement mea-
sure seem to reduce the amount of tax evasion through reducing the number of imported
used cars from which taxes have been evaded. Therefore, the real margin responses
(number of imported cars) and evasion responses (missing miles) depend on different but
related factors in a coherent way. To learn more about the effects of enforcement on
tax evasion, the next section provides evidence from an RCT in which we varied salient
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details about the use of third-party information in tax collection.
4.3 An RCT Analysis of Enforcement Policy
To examine more closely the role of enforcement on missing miles and more generally to
provide causal evidence of the effect of tax enforcement on tax evasion, we next present
the results of a randomized controlled trial (RCT) in this section. In August 2014, in
association with the Finnish Customs authority, we initiated an RCT to assess the efficacy
of different enforcement efforts stated in information letters. Customs sent out letters to
randomly chosen groups among a set of likely future importers of cars, providing different
information about different enforcement measures to randomized groups.
The target population for the experiment was individuals (not firms) who were judged
to be likely to import a used vehicle to Finland in the near future. Because the population
considering importing a vehicle is not directly observable, the experiment targeted those
who had imported a car in the recent past, up to three and half years prior to the
experiment (January 2011 - February 2014). In the data, about 40% of individuals who
bring at least one used car to Finland subsequently import another car within four years’
time.
The letters were sent to recipients who were randomly chosen from this baseline
population, and therefore any results are based on comparison of whether or not receiving
a letter or comparisons of the effects among different letter groups. In principle, the
treatments could affect either the intensive margin of tax evasion conditional on importing
a car and the extensive margin decision of whether or not to import a car, and we analyze
both margins below.
There were four different letters: a baseline (control/neutral) letter and three main
treatment letters, comprising about 5,000 letters in each group, for a total of about 20,000
letters.15 The results of the RCT must be interpreted in the context described in Figure
10 that showed that tax evasion in 2014 had significantly declined from previous years.
It is highly likely that at least some of the previous tax evaders already were aware of
the new enforcement measures, the salience of which the RCT attempts to increase.16
The first treatment is a control letter, included to gauge how receiving an anodyne
informational letter from the Customs affects potential car importers. This letter explains
how imported used vehicles are taxed and the consequences of non-compliance in general
terms.
The second treatment is designed to test the impact of the public disclosure of infor-
mation. The letter informs potential car importers that the Customs authority operates
15The letter wording is provided in Appendix E.
16Figure 20 in the Appendix E shows power calculations for the RCT by plotting the relationship of
sample size and alternative mean for the probability of car tax evasion and mileage difference between
car tax declaration and inspection.
24
a website where anyone can search for information about vehicles imported to Finland in
the past. By entering the vehicle identifying number (serial number), the user can learn
the mileage reported upon import and other characteristics about the car. The letter
specifies that the site can be used as a tool to approximate the (taxable) value of used
cars. In principle, if the mileage of the car upon import was significantly larger than
its current odometer reading, this suspicious mileage history could reduce the perceived
value of the car. The letter also mentions that the web service will likely be improved in
the future to make it even more informative about imported used vehicles.
We hypothesize that receiving this information reduces the willingness of an individual
to over-report the mileage of a car upon import while possibly planning to later deflate
the odometer reading for resale. The chances of getting away with this behavior are
reduced under public disclosure because the reported mileage upon import is publicly
available information and could be compared with the mileage reported when the car is
later put up for sale – e.g., adding 100,000 kilometers upon import that later disappears
looks suspicious to a potential buyer. Once it is clear that successful evasion is less likely,
we expect to see less inflation of mileage upon import.
The third treatment letter indicates that Customs will check the information provided
by a car importer against other administrative information, such as the mileage of the
vehicle recorded in the regular car inspection. The letter specifies that car tax declarations
where the reported mileage is at least 10% higher than the comparison mileage will be
audited. This is a probability notch design, where the notch is relative to the actual
mileage.17 This information may or may not be available to the general public, but the
most important message imparted is that it is available to Customs for enforcing the
car tax. The information is provided to the Customs by the Finnish Transport Safety
Agency. This cross-check presumably increases the probability of getting caught from tax
evasion, and in theory this would reduce the willingness to over-report the mileage. As
noted above, the effectiveness of this treatment letter depends on the extent to which the
information is new for prospective importers, and it might have not been new information
for all importers.
The fourth treatment combines the second and third treatments by including in the
same letter statements about the public disclosure system and the existence of the third-
party information. This treatment is included to learn about the combined effect of the
probability of detection and the effect of the public disclosure system on the future value
of the car.
All the letters specify that the time period to which the treatments apply is one
year from the time of receipt (from August 2014 to July 2015). This is the time period
for which the Finnish Customs committed to examine the differences in reported and
17Our analysis of the data does not show any evidence of bunching at this 10% threshold either before
or after the treatment in different groups.
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Letter group Pre-reform Post-reform
P (∆km<-5000) mean s.e. mean N mean s.e. mean N
0 .100 .003 13181 .093 .008 1450
1 .103 .004 5374 .076 .011 620
2 .108 .004 5409 .106 .012 631
3 .096 .004 5333 .067 .011 564
4 .099 .004 5401 .068 .010 601
∆km | Pre-reform Post-reform
∆km<-5000 mean s.e. mean N mean s.e. mean N
0 -69634 1566 1321 -59508 4441 135
1 -64414 2339 553 -72445 10703 47
2 -69646 2433 583 -54171 6670 67
3 -72007 2598 513 -48644 7976 38
4 -70805 2640 532 -51997 6960 41
Table 5: Pre- and post-reform differences in reported and inspected mileage and proba-
bility of this difference exceeding 5,000 kilometers by cars in treatment groups
Note: Table shows the balancing statistics of difference in kilometer between reported kilometers in
tax filing and comparison information and the probability of tax evasion – larger than 5,000 kilometer
misreporting – before the RCT by treatment group.
inspected mileages of imported used cars for these treatment groups. The effects of dif-
ferent letters can be disentangled by their potential differential impact on the car tax
mileage statements. Table 5 provides some statistics on the balance across the groups to
check that the randomization was successful and to help interpret the estimates. Table 5
shows the average share of the cars with mileage differences that exceed 5,000 kilometers
and the average pre-treatment mileage differences for those that have evaded. The table
shows that the probability of having more than a 5,000 kilometers negative difference
(missing miles) per imported car is approximately 10% across the groups. The mileage
difference between the import report and comparison inspection information hovers be-
tween 64,000 and 72,000 kilometers across groups for evaders. The groups seem to be
well-balanced according to both statistics.18 Finally, there are around 5,400 imported
used cars for which we observe the mileage comparison information before the treatment
in each letter group.
We use a standard difference-in-difference strategy to estimate the effects of different
information treatments. The main outcomes are mileage difference in the imported cars
and the number of cars each person imports. The latter analyses captures the extensive
margin responses, that is, if some individuals no longer importing a used car after re-
ceiving one of the letters. We compare different randomized groups before and after the
18Table 13 in Appendix F shows the balancing test results comparing treatment groups to the control
group for the difference in reported and inspected mileage in kilometers, the likelihood of misreporting
more than 5,000 kilometers and the number of days between reported mileage and car inspection. The
table shows that the groups are statistically very similar before treatment period.
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treatment. We estimate the following DD regression:
Yit = β0 + β11(aftert) + β21(treati) + β3DDit + β4Xit + εit (3)
where Y is the outcome variable, either (R−C)it, the mileage difference of used imported
cars between the reported mileage R and comparison information from car inspections C
for cars i in time t, or Nit, the number of imported used cars per person i within a time-
period t. The variable 1(aftert) takes the value of 1 after the treatment letter were sent
out and 0 otherwise, 1(treati) is an indicator taking the value of 1 for individuals that
received one of the letters and 0 for the control group, and DDit is the interaction variable
of the latter two terms. The coefficient β3 identifies the average change in an outcome
in the treatment group relative to the control group before and after the treatment. In
order to offer more precise estimates, we include a vector of control variables Xit in
the model that includes the time lapse between the reported mileage upon import and
the car inspection information in days, the CO2 emission level of an imported cars and
five-year car age cluster dummies for imported cars. We estimate using a difference-in-
differences method the effects of the treatments on the extent to which reported mileage
upon subsequent import differs from the lowest mileage upon inspection and on the
number of cars imported to Finland.
The results of the regression analyses with the mileage outcome difference are shown
in Table 6. A positive estimated coefficient on the DD variable indicates that mileage
reported upon import has been decreased in the treatment group relative to the control
group after receiving the treatment, and thus that tax evasion has been reduced due to
the treatment.
Column (1) shows the estimated overall treatment effect of receiving any one of the
treatment letters (letters number 2, 3 or 4) against receiving letter 1 (the neutral letter).
The DD coefficient indicates that the reported mileage upon import decreases by about
3,100 kilometers against inspection mileage, and the coefficient is statistically significant
at the 5% level. Column (2) compares letters 2, 3 and 4 against receiving no letter, and
columns (3) to (6) repeats the exercise, but comparing individual letters against the no-
letter group each in separate regressions. Column (7) combines those receiving letters 3
or 4 and compares them against the group receiving no letter, and column (8) compares
these against those either receiving no letter or receiving the neutral letter 1.
The individual letter treatments are not alone very robustly statistically significant in
columns (3) through (5), perhaps in part due to the relatively low number of observations.
When we compare letter 4 to the no-letter group, we estimate a positive and statistically
significant estimate of almost 3,000 no-longer-missing kilometers. Also, combining letters
3 and 4 tends to produce a statistically significant estimate of reducing tax evasion in
the form of missing mileage. This evidence suggests that offering information about the
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availability of third-party information decreases the misreporting of individuals. These
effects are non-trivial, as the pre-treatment mean difference is approximately 8,500 kilo-
meters. Therefore, the results suggest an approximately 35% decrease in misreported
mileage.19
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARS L1v2,3,4 L0v2,3,4 L0v1 L0v2 L0v3 L0v4 L0v3,4 L01v3,4
DD 3,101** 2,026* -1,203 1,396 1,831 2,922** 2,388** 2,731***
(1,582) (1,050) (1,657) (1,462) (1,412) (1,274) (1,114) (1,040)
Const. 7,650*** 5,671*** 6,036** 4,012 7,223*** 3,968 6,242*** 6,992***
(2,272) (1,998) (2,424) (2,644) (2,433) (2,434) (2,108) (1,867)
N 23,636 32,181 20,397 20,427 20,301 20,395 26,225 32,151
R2 0.251 0.257 0.255 0.270 0.257 0.252 0.250 0.248
Table 6: The effect of RCT on missing mileage
Note: Table shows the regression results on the mileage difference reported between car tax declaration
and inspection. Column (1) shows the effect of receiving any one of the treatment letters (letters number
2, 3 or 4) compared to receiving letter 1 (the neutral letter). Column (2) compares letters 2, 3 and
4 against receiving no letter, and columns (3) to (6) compare individual letters 1, 2, 3 and 4 against
the no-letter group, respectively. Column (7) compares groups receiving letters 3 and 4 against the
group receiving no letter, and finally, column (8) compares groups receiving 3 and 4 letters against those
receiving no letter or receiving the neutral letter 1. Heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors are
presented in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
We next repeat these regression analyses, but replace the outcome as an indicator
for having a negative difference in excess of 5,000 kilometers between the car tax filing
and the lowest subsequent inspection observation. Table 12 in Appendix F presents the
results of this exercise. An estimated negative coefficient is consistent with a treatment
restraining missing-miles tax evasion. The columns are organized in the same order as in
Table 6. We find some weak evidence of a statistically significant decline in tax evasion
in response to receiving a tax enforcement letter making tax evasion less attractive.
Finally, we turn to an analysis of how the letter treatments affected the number of
cars imported, in order to assess whether or not the knowledge of expanded enforcement
of evasion made importing less attractive. In principle, the expanded enforcement could
not only affect evasion but also the “real” decision of whether or not to import a car: some
marginal importers might import a used car only if the tax liability could be reduced by
evading. The extensive margin here is important, because that could bias the previously
presented mileage results, if a different number of cars were imported in different groups
19Table 11 in the Appendix E shows the regression estimates for the same analysis as presented in
Table 6, but narrowing the number of days between tax filing and inspection to under 31 days. These
results are very similar to those presented in Table 6, diminishing the concern that our baseline definition
of observing comparison mileage information “soon after” tax filing – four months difference between tax
filing and inspection – would affect the results.
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as a response to the letters. We calculate the number of cars imported per person before
the experiment, either by quarter or throughout the entire before and after periods. The
before period is defined to be from January, 2012 to June, 2014, and the after period is
from July, 2014 to September, 2015.
We first present the time trends of the number of car imports in the different treatment
groups in Figure 11. The upper panel of the figure shows the number of cars imported
per person and per quarter (conditional on having imported), reflecting intensive margin
responses. The lower panel shows the probability of importing at least one car per person
and per quarter, including the extensive margin decision (whether or not to import).
Neither panel shows an obvious effect. The intensive margin response shows some decline
in some of the letter groups, especially in the letter 2 group compared to the control
groups, but the differences are not systematic across groups or over time, and neither they
are statistically precise. The extensive margin response declines in all groups at the start
of the treatment (i.e., at time zero), because the baseline population was selected based on
having imported a car prior to the treatment (explained in detail above). However, there
are no discernible differences in whether or not to import a car between the randomized
groups even after the treatment.
To quantify these responses, we perform regressions with individual-level fixed effects
using again a DD estimation strategy and calculating robust standard errors throughout.
Table 7 shows the DD results for the number of cars imported (the intensive margin
response) by person and counting together all used cars that have been imported before
and after the treatment. Column (1) reports the estimated effect of receiving letters 2,
3 or 4 against receiving letter 1 (the neutral letter). Columns (2) to (4) compare the
control letter against other letters individually. Columns (5) to (7) compare letters 2, 3
and 4 against receiving no letter in individual specifications. None of the point estimates
is statistically significantly different from zero. The point estimates across different speci-
fications are not statistically significant and are both negative or positive, indicating that
the treatments did not change the number of used cars imported. Expanded enforcement
apparently reduced evasion without affecting in a detectable way the volume of used car
imports. This result helps to explain that the effects on mileage reported above did not
arise due to extensive margin responses rather than reducing the overreporting within
the cars that would have been imported regardless of the treatment.
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Figure 11: Time trends in the upper panel of changes in number of used cars imported
per person and in the lower panel of the probability of importing at least one car
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARS L1v2,3,4 L1v2 L1v3 L1v4 L0v2 L0v3 L0v4
Diff-in-Diff -0.358 -0.098 -0.032 0.030 -0.103 -0.047 0.011
(0.269) (0.083) (0.041) (0.036) (0.078) (0.042) (0.036)
Constant 1.687*** 1.346*** 1.174*** 1.142*** 1.325*** 1.230*** 1.210***
(0.112) (0.088) (0.046) (0.047) (0.063) (0.044) (0.046)
N 17,434 9,308 9,204 9,330 15,999 15,895 16,021
R2 0.026 0.029 0.042 0.029 0.018 0.017 0.014
N of indiv. 14,358 7,540 7,537 7,565 12,996 12,993 13,021
Table 7: The effect of RCT letters on the number of imported cars
Note: Table shows the difference-in-difference estimates on the number of imported used cars. Column
(1) shows the effect of receiving any one of the treatment letters (letters number 2, 3 or 4) compared
to receiving letter 1 (the neutral letter). Columns (2)–(4) compare letters 2, 3 and 4 against receiving
letter 1, respectively. Columns (5)–(7) compare letters 2, 3 and 4 against receiving no letter, respectively.
Heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors presented in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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In sum, the RCT results suggest that offering information about the usage of third-
party information in the tax enforcement can reduce the misreporting of individuals. The
letters created responses only for treatments that included information about the usage
of third-party information, while the treatment providing information about the public
disclosure of information did not decrease the amount of tax evasion. However, offering
salient information about the usage of third-party information in tax collection or public
disclosure information seemed not to have any effects on the number of cars imported.
5 Conclusions
This paper studies the importing behavior of used cars to Finland. We focus on tax
evasion responses to the tax system relying on a unique trace of tax evasion based on
comparing the mileage reported upon import, which affects the car tax liability, with the
mileage recorded in annual and mandatory car inspections. Observing that the mileage
of a car is lower in inspections about at the same time as the mileage is reported in car
tax declaration is a strong indicator of tax evasion.
Our results show that missing-miles tax evasion is a fairly common phenomenon in
Finland, detected in approximately 10% of imported cars. This kind of tax evasion is
relatively more common among imports of cars that face higher car tax rates, suggesting
a positive correlation between tax rates and tax evasion. However, when we use the
variation in tax rates created by the tax reform of 2012, we observe that the tax rates
have a relatively strong effect visible as a clear deviation from pre-reform trends on used
car imports among non-evaders. For evaders the same variation in car tax rates has
a much smaller and not statistically significant effect. Thus, the natural experiment
evidence creating exogenous variation in tax rates suggest real responses for non-evading
car importers but not for the extent of tax evasion.
We offer descriptive evidence that a stricter enforcement regime reduced tax evasion.
To provide more compelling evidence of the causal effect of the enforcement regime,
we study the results from an RCT design that shows that offering salient information
about more effective tax enforcement initiatives enhances the efficiency of tax collection.
Increasing the salience of the use of third-party information on mileage to detect evasion
in the RCT reduced the mileage reported upon import, while not affecting the number of
imported used cars. However, offering information about the public disclosure of mileage
reported did not change the reporting behavior of car importers.
Our results produce rich detail about the interaction between tax evasion and real
behavior. We find that only non-evaders respond to the tax rate changes by decreasing
the number of imported used cars after the tax increase, while evaders do not: the
statutory rates matter less to those planning to evade their burden. We also find a
clear reduction in tax evasion due to the improvements in enforcement practices and
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after offering information about them. These results together show that the real margin
responses (the number of imported cars) and the evasion responses (missing miles) depend
on different factors. These results suggest that, in this setting, different remedies should
be targeted to the different policy concerns: enforcement improvements and information
about them to tackle tax evasion, and tax rate adjustments to affect real behavior.
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A Appendix: Estimating the Tax Value of Mileage
We employ a linear relationship between car taxes and mileage in the analysis, conditional
on car make, age and CO2 value. The rationale for this assumption is that as far as we
know, Customs uses a linear predictor in mileage in determining the taxable value of
car. Figure 12 shows a binscatter between car tax residuals from regression, where car
taxes are estimated against car make, model, car age cells and CO2 cells, and mileage.
Although the linear assumption fails slightly in the tail ends, overall the assumption is
supported relatively well by the figure.
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Figure 12: Binscatter between car tax residuals and mileage
In this appendix, we discuss the regressions in Section 3.1 that are used to draw Figure
13. Separately for each CO2 quintile, an estimation is first made that explains the amount
of car taxes actually remitted. We use a specification that explains through covariates
the taxable value of a car, and which is likely to be very similar to what the Customs
actually uses when calculating the taxable value of a car. One of the covariates is the
reported mileage, which is the coefficient we use for calculating the euro value of missing
miles. The other important covariates are a vector of 100 dummies for CO2 values, the
age of the imported used car in years at the time of importing and fixed effects for the
make of the car. The equation to be estimated takes the following form.
Taxc = α + β1mileagec + β2CO2c + β3CarAgec + µc + c
The coefficient β1 explains the contribution of mileage to the euro amount of car tax
liability. We then take this coefficient for each car and multiply that coefficient by the
absolute value of miles estimated to be inflated in the car tax report, i.e. the difference
between reported mileage and the lowest inspection mileage at the time of importing the
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car or later. The result of the multiplication is informative of the euro amount of tax
evasion for each car. The figures are drawn from the CO2 quintile averages.
VARS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
km -5.411*** -3.915*** -3.814*** -4.102*** -5.601*** -7.141***
(0.630) (1.053) (1.247) (1.118) (1.360) (1.248)
CO2 29.739*** -2.479 -445.265*** -1,339.565*** 1,073.463*** -147.086***
(4.155) (3.556) (140.191) (195.900) (125.515) (33.119)
CO22 -0.027** 0.124*** 1.365*** 3.591*** -2.432*** 0.301***
(0.011) (0.015) (0.416) (0.518) (0.294) (0.062)
T btw. info -18.971*** -13.671*** -17.553*** -23.201*** -16.692*** -27.623***
(0.570) (0.634) (0.724) (0.835) (0.962) (2.208)
Constant 3,375*** 2,505*** 43,363*** 133,952*** -107,324*** 29,462***
(474.604) (295.447) (11,782.686) (18,525.852) (13,375.176) (4,474.997)
N 186,322 35,202 38,318 38,092 36,881 37,829
R2 0.320 0.516 0.507 0.512 0.436 0.235
Table 8: Estimates for the relationship between mileage and car taxes with other covari-
ates
Heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors presented in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
In Table 8 the outcome is car taxes remitted on a car, in euros. The main explanatory
variable is mileage on a car in 1,000 kilometers. Other covariates include the CO2 value,
linearly and in cubic form, the time between importing and observing the mileage in
months, car age dummies at the time of importing and make fixed effects. Column (1)
is for all cars in the sample, column (2) for cars in the first CO2 quintile, column (3) for
cars in the second CO2 quintile, and so forth. The estimated negative coefficient of -5.4
in column (1) indicates that 1,000 kilometers more reduce car taxes by 5.4 euros for an
average car. The result is that, across CO2 quintiles, higher CO2 values are associated
with larger coefficients of mileage in absolute value. This relationship that average taxes
reduce more with higher mileage arises from car tax rates increasing with CO2 values.
Also, cars that have higher CO2 values tend to be more expensive, making the taxable
value larger.
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B The Aggregate Amount of Missing-Miles Tax Eva-
sion
To shed further light on the extent of the missing-miles phenomenon, we approximate the
amount of tax evasion in euros. To perform this calculation, we first estimate a regression
of actual car tax liability against the reported mileage for each CO2 quintile separately.
The amount of car taxes of each car is regressed against the reported mileage, denoted
mileage. The regression includes also other covariates, X, to be able to fully explain the
determination of car taxes. These other covariates include CO2 values linearly and in
cubic form (which is quite flexible given that we already estimate this separately for five
different CO2 bins), fixed effects for the make of a car, µc, and eight dummies for the
age of the car in years when the car was imported to Finland. The regression equation
is estimated separately for each CO2 quintile as follows.
Taxc = α + β1mileagec + β2Xc + µc + c (4)
The results of this regression are shown in Appendix A in Table 8. In summary,
the results confirm that higher mileage is associated with lower car taxes on average:
1,000 more reported kilometers reduce the car taxes on average by about 5.4 euros. The
relationship increases in absolute value with CO2 classes. In order to estimate the amount
of uncollected tax, we add to the predicted car taxes a number of missing miles multiplied
by the coefficient from the regression estimate of to what extent higher reported mileage
reduces car tax liability. To calculate evasion, we used only those cases where the “missing
miles” exceeded 5,000 kilometers. For example, consider a car that, based on the reported
values, is estimated to have remitted 3,000 euros in car taxes. However, for that car we
observe 100,000 kilometers missing from the car tax report. The example car is in the
second highest CO2 quintile, for which an additional 1,000 reported kilometers reduces
the car tax liability by an average of 5.6 euros. Thus, in this case we add 560 euros to
the 3,000 euros to get to the true tax liability for this car, 3,560 euros.
Using the framework explained above, we can calculate the expected tax liability, the
estimated tax evasion, and the estimated true tax liability for all cars. We then aggregate
the data across the CO2 quintiles to come up with average taxes paid and average car tax
evasion by CO2 quintile. We draw Figure 13 from these averages. The 95% confidence
interval is based on the standard error for the mean.
Figure 13 shows, for each quintile, the average taxes from an average car imported,
from a car imported that has been detected having tax evasion and what these taxes
would on average be when the amount of tax evasion is added to the reported taxes.
The figure suggests that missing miles tax evasion leads to a significant reduction of car
tax collections in all CO2 quintiles. The tax evasion is more pronounced in the higher
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quintiles, likely because in higher quintiles more taxes are being evaded and because a
given amount of overstated miles contributes more to the tax bill in the higher quintiles.
However, tax evasion is statistically and economically significant in all quintiles.
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Figure 13: Euro amount of car taxes by CO2 quintiles with controls
We show the aggregate statistics of these tax evasion estimates in Table 9. Columns
(1) to (3) show average numbers in euros, and columns (4) to (6) show aggregate numbers
in thousands of euros. Column (1) shows the average car tax remitted by all used car
importers, and column (2) shows the tax remitted by those who have been detected of
evading. Column (3) shows the average amount of tax evasion estimated by the method
described above. Column (4) shows the aggregate car tax remitted by all importers,
and column (5) the aggregate tax remitted by the importers that have been detected of
evading. Column (6) shows the aggregate amount of tax evasion. The first five rows refer
to CO2 quintiles, and the last row shows the sum over all cars in the column.
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CO2cl Tax Tax owed Estimated Total tax owed Total tax owed Total estimated
All by evader evasion by all by evader evasion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1 3710 2209 383 150756 4128 717
2 4298 2503 396 177370 5601 886
3 4814 2775 434 196355 8673 1356
4 4601 3052 547 182262 11664 2089
5 5946 4041 756 245380 20033 3749
Total 23369 14580 2516 952123 50099 8797
Table 9: Descriptive statistics of estimated tax evasion in euros
Table 9 shows, that of the total amount of taxes of approximately 952 million euros
over the eight-year inspection horizon (column (4)), we estimate that evasion totalled 8.8
million euros (column (6)). Furthermore, the evaders remitted as an aggregate only 50
million euros (column (5)), and thus evaded about 15% of the tax revenue they should
have remitted. We believe that this tax evasion measure is probably a lower bound of
true tax evasion due to, for example, incomplete detection of “inflated” mileage in the car
tax reports.
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C Appendix: The Likelihood of Evading
Next, we present evidence on the likelihood of importing cars and evading car taxes
around the 2012 reform for the low and high CO2 emission groups. This is based on re-
gressions of half-year indicators on the dummy of whether or not the reported mileage was
5,000 kilometers higher than the comparison information separately for the two groups
separately. The equation to be estimated is as follows:
D(diffkm > 5000)ct = α +
8∑
t=1
βtHalfyeart + ζ1CO2c + ζ2Obsmileagect + ct. (5)
In equation (5), the outcome is the dummy for having a discrepancy of more than
5,000 kilometers. This is regressed against 8 indicators for Halfyear, CO2 value and the
time difference between the import and the inspection (Obsmileage) of a car c in half
year t. The variable ct is the residual error term. In the figure the two lines are centered
at zero in period -2, and the lines represent deviations from the trend around this point.
Figure 14 shows the coefficients of interest,βi. It is clear from the figure that the trends
in the two groups follow each other fairly closely prior to the reform, but as soon as the
reform happens (i.e., starting in April 2012) the likelihood of import tax evasion jumps
up for the high CO2 emission group by about 4 percentage points, with no estimated
increase for the low CO2 emission group. The estimated likelihood of evasion stays on
a higher level for two years after the reform for the high CO2 group relative to the low
CO2 group. The figure establishes that the two groups can be meaningfully compared,
and that tax rates seem to increase the extent of tax evasion quite significantly.
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Figure 14: Likelihood of tax evasion around the 2012 reform
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D Appendix: Elasticity Calculations
In this Appendix we show that used car prices in Finland developed smoothly around
the 2012 reform and quantify the value of tax evasion and import response to tax rates
in monetary terms.
Figure 15 shows the new and used car price indices in the Finnish car markets around
the 2012 reform that increased car taxes on average for imported cars. The indices
show that although the indices do not develop completely smoothly, they do not seem
to respond to the reform, and instead continue on the same trend as before the reform.
This serves as a robustness check of the general equilibrium effects on the imported used
cars.
Next, we calculate the estimated amount of tax revenue lost due to missing miles
utilizing the same framework that was described in Figure 14 and Table 10. The estimated
euro amount of tax evasion is the outcome of a regression that is estimated as follows:
logEvasionct = α + β1 log(1 +MTR)ct + ζ1X + ct (6)
In equation (6) the outcome (logEvasionct) is the log of the euro amount of estimated
evasion, and the explanatory variables are the log of the tax price (one plus the car tax
rate) and a vector of covariates for car c observed at half year t. The variable ct is
the residual error term. The covariates used include fixed effects for the make of a car,
dummies for the age of the car at the time of import, dummies for CO2 emissions and
dummies for the weight of a car in 20 bins. The data is restricted to the six years around
the 2012 reform by the year of import.
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One feature in this setting is that observed tax evasion is a combination of the con-
tinuous choice of how much tax to evade, and whether or not to import a used car and
possibly evade taxes. In an attempt to control for the importing behavior, we impose a
two-stage structure, where we first estimate a differences-in-differences model in which
the outcome is the number of imported used car in cells defined by make, CO2 and car
age dummies as well as tax evasion dummy. Apart from the outcome variable, the model
specification is the same as in Table 10. We then predict how the tax reform affected
the extensive margin choices of what kind of cars are being imported and use this as an
additional covariate in the elasticity estimation. If the tax rate variable has a statistically
significant coefficient even after controlling for this extensive margin behavior, then the
intensive margin evasion depends on tax rates.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARS Evasion Evasion 1st stage Evasion Evasion Taxes Taxes
Elasticity 3.108*** 1.174** 2.427*** -0.107 1.235*** 0.265***
(0.369) (0.594) (0.367) (0.589) (0.075) (0.041)
DD -0.207***
(0.014)
Pred N ev. -0.286*** -1.998*** 0.231*** -0.207***
(0.020) (0.304) (0.005) (0.027)
High CO2 0.279*** 0.113 -0.206*** 0.282*** -0.655*** 0.154*** 0.300***
(0.040) (0.244) (0.075) (0.039) (0.248) (0.008) (0.052)
After -2.871*** -2.058*** -0.318*** -2.910*** -3.338*** 0.175*** 0.234***
(0.030) (0.079) (0.029) (0.030) (0.207) (0.006) (0.019)
Constant 3.595*** 3.657*** -0.060 4.270*** 3.104*** 7.230*** 7.712***
(0.069) (0.384) (0.144) (0.083) (0.390) (0.021) (0.101)
N 23,010 23,010 97,230 23,010 23,010 94,053 94,053
R2 0.293 0.355 0.308 0.300 0.371 0.093 0.814
Controls X X X X
Table 10: Estimates of elasticity of tax evasion and taxes in euros with respect to the tax
price (one plus the car tax rate)
Heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors presented in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 10 presents the estimates of the elasticity of the euro value of tax evasion with
respect to the tax price. The outcome variable in columns (1) through (5) is the log of
the euro value of evasion and in columns (6) and (7) the log of the euro value of car taxes
added with the estimated evasion. Columns (1) and (2) present a regression without
controlling for the extensive margin behavior. Column (1) presents a simple regression
with only the variables visible in the table: the log of tax price, a dummy for high CO2
group, a dummy for after the reform, and a constant. The estimated elasticity is quite
high in column (1), 3.11, indicating that higher tax rates lead to significantly more tax
evasion from an average imported used car. Column (2) repeats this exercise and adds the
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extensive vector of controls described above. The controls reduce the estimated coefficient
to 1.17, but it remains highly statistically significant.
This first-stage estimate for how tax rate affects the kind of cars imported is presented
in column (3). We then use the prediction from this regression to control for the effect of
tax reform on what kind of cars are being imported. Inclusion of this control variable in
column (4) produces a somewhat smaller elasticity estimate compared to that in column
(1). When we add a full vector of control variables in column (5), the elasticity estimate
is no longer statistically different from zero, and the point estimate is close to zero, -
0.11. This suggests that the elasticity of tax evasion with respect to the tax price occurs
primarily along the extensive margin (whether or not to evade), because controlling for
the extensive margin behavior eliminates both the economical and statistical significance
of the elasticity estimate (with other controls).
Finally, columns (6) and (7) show the elasticity with respect to the tax price of
the true car taxes: the reported car taxes added with the evasion. Column (6) is a
sparse specification, and column (7) shows a specification with a full set of controls.
The estimated elasticities are 1.23 and 0.27, respectively. These estimates indicate that
increasing the tax rate has a modest positive impact on the remitted car taxes.
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E Appendix: Details of the RCT
 
 
 
August 14, 2014 
Customs develops services relating to car taxes and process of importing 
cars  
  
  
Dear Recipient, 
  
You have dealt with Customs on matters relating to car taxes in 2010 or after. This letter is not related to these 
dealings, but rather it’s meaning is to inform you about regulation of car taxes and new services relating to them. One 
of the new services Customs has set up is electronic form with which to make declaration about registering a new car 
to be used in Finland.  
   
If you are about to import a used car to Finland, you should follow these steps:  
 
1. Submit the declaration of use form. Now you can do it electronically in web address 
www.tulli.fi/fi/yksityisille/autoverotus/kayttoonottoilmoitus.  
2. Fill in the car tax declaration form. Submit it with the appropriate attachments within five days from filing the 
declaration of usage form.  
3. After you have received a decision on your car taxes and remitted the car taxes, register your car to be used in 
Finland. You can find more precise instruction from a brochure that comes with this letter, or from the web 
address  www.tulli.fi/fi/yksityisille/autoverotus/. 
The amount of car taxes is determined by the taxable value of a vehicle and car tax rate. The taxable value of a 
vehicle is the general retail sales price of a similar car in Finland. The similarity is based on for example make, model, 
year-model, condition and mileage of a car. From the general retail sales price a deduction of 5% and amount of 750 
euros are deducted. The taxable value of a vehicle is formed like this. Car tax rate is based usually on the CO2 
emissions of a vehicle. For example, if the car tax rate is 25 and the taxable value of a vehicle is 10 000 euros, car 
taxes amount to 2 500 euros. 
  
If you declare incorrect information in car tax form about your vehicle, an addition can be imposed on top of your 
normal car taxes (at most three times the amount of car tax). The sanctions are announced in more detail in car tax 
law (59 §).  
 
  
Kind Regards,  
Figure 16: Letter 1: Control group
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August 14, 2014 
Customs develops services relating to car taxes and process of importing 
cars  
  
  
Dear Recipient, 
  
You have dealt with Customs on matters relating to car taxes in 2010 or after. This letter is not related to these 
dealings, but rather it’s meaning is to inform you about regulation of car taxes and new services relating to them. One 
of the new services Customs has set up is electronic form with which to make declaration about registering a new car 
to be used in Finland.  
   
If you are about to import a used car to Finland, you should follow these steps:  
 
1. Submit the declaration of use form. Now you can do it electronically in web address 
www.tulli.fi/fi/yksityisille/autoverotus/kayttoonottoilmoitus.  
2. Fill in the car tax declaration form. Submit it with the appropriate attachments within five days from filing the 
declaration of usage form.  
3. After you have received a decision on your car taxes and remitted the car taxes, register your car to be used in 
Finland. You can find more precise instruction from a brochure that comes with this letter, or from the web 
address  www.tulli.fi/fi/yksityisille/autoverotus/. 
Customs provides also as a new service Internet service for tax information.  With this free service you can inspect 
the information of any car imported as used found in car tax decision imported, like the CO2 emissions, mileage and 
the amount of car taxes. The service is in web address  www.tulli.fi/fi/yksityisille/autoverotus/MAHTI.jsp 
You can use this service as a help when you assess the value of a used car. If, for example, mileage of a car is 
significantly larger in car tax decision than later in the odometer, is the value of this car lower, than a car that has a 
coherent mileage history.  
Internet service for tax information will be developed so that in the future it is even more easy to use. At the moment, 
one can search vehicles with the vehicle identification number. In the future it is possible to make searches with the 
register plate number.  
 
The amount of car taxes is determined by the taxable value of a vehicle and car tax rate. The taxable value of a 
vehicle is the general retail sales price of a similar car in Finland. The similarity is based on for example make, model, 
year-model, condition and mileage of a car. From the general retail sales price a deduction of 5% and amount of 750 
Figure 17: Letter 2: Treatment of public disclosure of information
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August 14, 2014 
Customs develops services relating to car taxes and process of importing 
cars  
  
  
Dear Recipient, 
  
You have dealt with Customs on matters relating to car taxes in 2010 or after. This letter is not related to these 
dealings, but rather it’s meaning is to inform you about regulation of car taxes and new services relating to them. One 
of the new services Customs has set up is electronic form with which to make declaration about registering a new car 
to be used in Finland.  
   
If you are about to import a used car to Finland, you should follow these steps:  
 
1. Submit the declaration of use form. Now you can do it electronically in web address 
www.tulli.fi/fi/yksityisille/autoverotus/kayttoonottoilmoitus.  
2. Fill in the car tax declaration form. Submit it with the appropriate attachments within five days from filing the 
declaration of usage form.  
3. After you have received a decision on your car taxes and remitted the car taxes, register your car to be used in 
Finland. You can find more precise instruction from a brochure that comes with this letter, or from the web 
address  www.tulli.fi/fi/yksityisille/autoverotus/. 
 
Customs enforces car taxation of vehicles imported from abroad. In the enforcement of car taxation, Customs has 
used since 2013 as supplementary source information collected in registration audits, such as mileage on vehicle. 
 
To guarantee fair and just car taxation for all, Customs takes into retrospective audits all vehicles imported during 
08/2014–07/2015, which has a difference in odometer reader and the comparison information greater than 10 per 
cent. In the cases where this occurs, Customs reinitiates the car tax process.  
 
The amount of car taxes is determined by the taxable value of a vehicle and car tax rate. The taxable value of a 
vehicle is the general retail sales price of a similar car in Finland. The similarity is based on for example make, model, 
year-model, condition and mileage of a car. From the general retail sales price a deduction of 5% and amount of 750 
euros are deducted. The taxable value of a vehicle is formed like this. Car tax rate is based usually on the CO2 
Figure 18: Letter 3: Treatment of available third party comparison information
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August 14, 2014 
Customs develops services relating to car taxes and process of importing 
cars  
  
  
Dear Recipient, 
  
You have dealt with Customs on matters relating to car taxes in 2010 or after. This letter is not related to these 
dealings, but rather it’s meaning is to inform you about regulation of car taxes and new services relating to them. One 
of the new services Customs has set up is electronic form with which to make declaration about registering a new car 
to be used in Finland.  
   
If you are about to import a used car to Finland, you should follow these steps:  
 
1. Submit the declaration of use form. Now you can do it electronically in web address 
www.tulli.fi/fi/yksityisille/autoverotus/kayttoonottoilmoitus.  
2. Fill in the car tax declaration form. Submit it with the appropriate attachments within five days from filing the 
declaration of usage form.  
3. After you have received a decision on your car taxes and remitted the car taxes, register your car to be used in 
Finland. You can find more precise instruction from a brochure that comes with this letter, or from the web 
address  www.tulli.fi/fi/yksityisille/autoverotus/. 
Customs enforces car taxation of vehicles imported from abroad. In the enforcement of car taxation, Customs has 
used since 2013 as supplementary source information collected in registration audits, such as mileage on vehicle. 
Customs takes into retrospective audits all vehicles imported during 08/2014–07/2015, which has a difference in 
odometer reader and the comparison information greater than 10 per cent. In the cases where this occurs, Customs 
reinitiates the car tax process.  
Customs provides also as a new service Internet service for tax information.  With this free service you can inspect 
the information of any car imported as used found in car tax decision imported, like the CO2 emissions, mileage and 
the amount of car taxes. The service is in web address  www.tulli.fi/fi/yksityisille/autoverotus/MAHTI.jsp. You can use 
this service as a help when you assess the value of a used car. If, for example, mileage of a car is significantly larger 
in car tax decision than later, is the value of this car lower, than a car that has a coherent mileage history.  
 
The amount of car taxes is determined by the taxable value of a vehicle and car tax rate. The taxable value of a 
vehicle is the general retail sales price of a similar car in Finland. The similarity is based on for example make, model, 
Figure 19: Letter 4: Interaction treatment of public disclosure of information and avail-
able third party comparison information
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Figure 20: Power calculations for probability to evade car taxes (upper-panel) and mileage
difference between car tax declaration and inspection (lower-panel)
Note: Figure shows the power calculations by the sample size (y-axis) and mean response (x-axis)
using the pre-reform averages and standard deviations with power of 80%. The horizontal lines mark
the selected sample size for each treatment groups. The upper-panel shows the calculations for the
probability of car tax evasion, and the lower-panel shows the calculations for the mileage difference
between car tax declaration and inspections.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARS L1v2,3,4 L0v2,3,4 L0v1 L0v2 L0v3 L0v4 L0v3,4 L01v3,4
DD 3,356** 2,013* -1,422 1,764 1,863 2,531** 2,188** 2,601**
(1,564) (1,043) (1,647) (1,455) (1,401) (1,258) (1,105) (1,029)
Const. 7,950*** 7,762*** 7,084*** 6,813*** 9,756*** 6,339*** 8,291*** 8,077***
(2,203) (1,819) (1,969) (2,451) (2,026) (1,980) (1,770) (1,574)
N 21,118 28,669 18,225 18,186 18,087 18,172 23,371 28,708
R2 0.168 0.166 0.176 0.174 0.168 0.164 0.163 0.166
Table 11: The effect of RCT on missing mileage for comparison information within one
month from tax filing
Note: Table shows the regression results on the mileage difference reported between car tax declara-
tion and inspection observed within one month from tax declaration. Column (1) shows the effect of
receiving any one of the treatment letters (letters number 2, 3 or 4) compared to receiving letter 1 (the
neutral letter). Column (2) compares letters 2, 3 and 4 against receiving no letter, and columns (3)
to (6) compare individual letters 1, 2, 3 and 4 against the no-letter group, respectively. Column (7)
compares groups receiving letters 3 and 4 against the group receiving no letter, and finally, column (8)
compares groups receiving 3 and 4 letters against those receiving no letter or receiving the neutral letter
1. Heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors presented in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARS L1v2,3,4 L0v2,3,4 L0v1 L0v2 L0v3 L0v4 L0v3,4 L01v3,4
DD -0.000 -0.016 -0.016 -0.006 -0.019 -0.022* -0.021* -0.016
(0.013) (0.010) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.011) (0.010)
Const. -0.066*** -0.068*** -0.077*** -0.063*** -0.069*** -0.079*** -0.074*** -0.076***
(0.015) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010)
N 23,756 32,332 20,482 20,516 20,393 20,481 26,345 32,298
R2 0.042 0.040 0.037 0.043 0.036 0.038 0.037 0.037
Table 12: The effect of RCT on an indicator of having greater than -5,000 kilometers
difference
Note: Table shows the regression results on the dummy variable constituted based on the difference
reported between car tax declaration and inspection, equaling 1 if the difference is larger than -5,000
kilometers and 0 otherwise. Column (1) shows the effect of receiving any one of the treatment letters
(letters number 2, 3 or 4) compared to receiving letter 1 (the neutral letter). Column (2) compares
letters 2, 3 and 4 against receiving no letter, and columns (3) to (6) compare individual letters 1, 2, 3
and 4 against the no-letter group, respectively. Column (7) compares groups receiving letters 3 and 4
against the group receiving no letter, and finally, column (8) compares groups receiving 3 and 4 letters
against those receiving no letter or receiving the neutral letter 1. Heteroscedasticity consistent standard
errors presented in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Figure 21: Number of days between tax filing and inspection
Treatment ∆ in km t-test: P (∆km<-5k) t-test: ∆ in days t-test:
mean 0 vs. treat mean 0 vs. treat mean 0 vs. treat
0 8754.4 .100 11.548
1 8723.3 .962 .103 .582 11.326 .333
2 8371.2 .563 .108 .122 11.642 .684
3 8531.9 .737 .096 .406 11.379 .462
4 8250.6 .445 .099 .722 11.312 .304
Table 13: Balancing tests between control and treatment groups
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARS L1v2,3,4 L0v2,3,4 L0v1 L0v2 L0v3 L0v4 L0v3,4 L01v3,4
DD -0.011 -0.012 -0.002 0.004 -0.013 -0.027** -0.021** -0.020**
(0.012) (0.009) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009)
EV*DD 0.029 -0.008 -0.036 -0.017 -0.038 0.035 -0.004 0.006
(0.038) (0.030) (0.040) (0.040) (0.038) (0.044) (0.033) (0.031)
Const. -0.049*** -0.032*** -0.031*** -0.030** -0.016 -0.030*** -0.025*** -0.032***
(0.014) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
N 23,756 32,332 20,482 20,516 20,393 20,481 26,345 32,298
R2 0.571 0.568 0.563 0.564 0.560 0.570 0.567 0.567
Table 14: The effect of RCT on an indicator of having greater than -5,000 kilometers
difference with dummies for previous tax evaders
Heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors presented in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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